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NOTES AND COMMENT
word "insurance" in a negligence action may in itself be ground for
the reversal of a judgment, and this notwithstanding that the jury has
been instructed to disregard such reference. 47  In the majority of the
cases where this rule was invoked, however, it was apparent that
counsel injected the irrelevant reference to insurance with the delib-
erate purpose of prejudicing the defendant. In such instances the
rule may be justified.4 8 But where wilfulness is absent, it would
seem that an instruction to the jury to disregard the statement is all
that the defendant is entitled to for the safeguardment of his rights.
To hold otherwise is a direct reflection on the intelligence of our
jurors.49
To summarize it may be said:
(1) As a general rule any reference in a negligence action that
the defendant is insured is improper; violation of the rule
where it appears that the defendant has been prejudiced
thereby, will result in a new trial in spite of the fact that
the jury has been instructed to disregard the reference;
(2) This rule does not exclude evidence of insurance where
such evidence is relevant upon any material controverted
fact;
(3) Evidence of insurance may be admissible where it forms
part of a competent admission;
(4) Evidence of insurance may be admissible to show bias and
interest of witnesses;
(5) Evidence of insurance may be admissible to show the in-
terest of jurors; questions relating to specific insurance
companies are probably proper, providing they convey no
inference that the defendant is insured.
Louis J. GUSMANO.
DUTY OF RELATIVES TO SUPPORT DEPENDENTS.
I.
More and more the problem of support of dependents by relatives
has become recognized as a legal as well as a moral and social obliga-
47 See note 11, supra.
48 See notes 13, 14, mpra.
49 Shaier v. Broadway Improvement Co., 22 App. Div. 102, 47 N. Y. Supp.
815 (1st Dept. 1897) ("It would be a severe reflection upon the integrity and
intelligence of this jury for us to assume that because such a question was asked
they disregarded the sworn testimony of the witness, and, in violation of the
express direction of the court, assumed that the insurance company was inter-
ested in the case and allowed such an inference to affect their verdict").
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tion. Present-day concepts of social obligations have forced the legis-
lature, together with the courts, to take a more realistic attitude in this
problem. They are forcing the duty of support upon those who
should bear it and are relieving the social agencies and public institu-
tions of the burden. In most states, the obligation of support has been
recognized and is controlled by statute.1 In all but one state the stat-
utes have given recognition to the common law duty of a parent to
support his children during their minority,2 and now make the parent
liable for the children whenever there, arises a possibility that the child,
whether minor or adult, will likely become a public charge. 3  But too
often where the children are apt to become public charges, the parents
are likewise destitute. When this occurs, the only recourse is that the
duty of support then fall upon the public. Still in certain cases, it has
been the parent who has suffered the reverses in life while the children
are supporting themselves comfortably. In such an event, the legis-
latures have given recognition to the moral obligation 4 and hold the
children liable for the support of their less fortunate parents.
Similarly, has the duty of a husband to support his wife, whether
separated or living together, been strengthened into an iron-clad duty
that is reciprocal in its nature. From the earliest common law to the
present statutory obligation, 5 it was a husband's duty to furnish the
necessities of life to his wife. It is, in most jurisdictions today, recog-
nized as obligatory upon the wife, whenever she has independent
I N. Y. Dom. REL. COURT ACT § 101 is typical of the statutes throughout the
United States.
2 People v. Pierson, 176 N. Y. 201, 208, 68 N. E. 243, 246 (1903) ; People
ex rel. Ramm v. Ramm, 197 N. Y. Supp. 234 (1922). The State of Kansas
imposes no civil liability, but it does have a criminal statute that creates the
obligation, KANSAS REV. STAT. (1923) § 21(442).
3 The common law imposed the duty on the father for infant children dur-
ing minority. Betz v. Horr, 276 N. Y. 83, 11 N. E. (2d) 548 (1937). The
statute imposes the duty for adult children who may become public charges,
Frankel v. Goldstein, 155 Misc. 531, 280 N. Y. Supp. 191 (1935). The father is
liable for necessities, and if he furnishes them, he cannot be held for neglecting
his duty, Van Valkinburgh v. Watson, 13 Johns. 480 (N. Y. 1816); Winter v.
Winter, 246 App. Div. 232, 285 N. Y. Supp. 260 (lst Dept. 1936); Fagal v.
Rigir, 247 App. Div. 853, 286 N. Y. Supp. 484 (3d Dept. 1936).
4 Duffy v. Yordi, 149 Cal. 140, 84 Pac. 838 (1906) ; Cook v. Bradley, 7
Conn. 57 (1828) ; Stone v. Stone, 32 Conn. 142 (1864); Lebanon v. Griffin, 45
N. H. 558 (1864); In re Public Welfare Dept., 269 N. Y. 13, 198 N. E. 613,
rev'g, 245 App. Div. 1, 280 N. Y. Supp. 489 (2d Dept. 1935) ; Edwards v. Davis,
16 Johns. 281 (N. Y. 1819) ; 1 BL. Com. *453 holds that it is a moral obliga-
tion resting on the children; 2 KENT'S Comm. *207; SCHOULER, DOINESTIC RELA-
TIONS (6th ed. 1921) 787.
5 Fisher v. Drew, 247 Mass. 178, 141 N. E. 875 (1923) ; Keller v. Philips,
39 N. Y. 351, 354 (1868); Goodale v. Lawrence, 88 N. Y. 513 (1882);
DeBrauwere v. DeBrauwere, 203 N. Y. 460, 96 N. E. 722 (1911); Rodgers v.
Rodgers, 229 N. Y. 255, 128 N. E. 117 (1920) ; Note (1938) 13 ST. JOHN'S LAW
REV. 105; 3 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS (lst ed. 1935) 48. Contra:
Morton v. Rhodes, 18 Barb. 100 (N. Y. 1854).
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means, to support her husband who is likely to become a public
charge.6
II.
Certain phases of the now recognized obligations between rela-
tives are, historically speaking, comparatively new. At common law,
the legal obligation of children to support their parents, was unknown.7
It was only in some instances recognized as a moral obligation, and a
moral obligation was not enforceable in a court of law. It was only in
equity that the duty was recognized to any extent. There, in seeking
to do justice, equity would spell out an obligation wherever possible.
Any agreements entered into between parents and children whereby
the children bound themselves to provide and pay for their parents'
necessities were usually enforced.8  Also in recognition of this moral
obligation, equity would not imply any remuneration for the services
rendered to the parent by the children unless there was an express
contract to that effect. 9 But with chance and uncertainty being such a
large element in the enforcement of the obligation, it can hardly be
said that support was assured to those parents who had need of it.
Not only in that respect was the common law harsh and reluctant
to spell out a legal duty, but it failed to provide adequately for support
of children by their step-parents or those who stood in ldcus parentis.Y0
Adoption was unknown at common law 11 and whatever support was
given the children was a mere gratuity. The fact that the step-parent
had assumed that relationship did not force upon him any obliga-
tions,1 2 and any expenditures incurred by the step-parent were items
6 Livingston v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. 633, 49 Pac. 836 (1897) ; Hagert
v. Hagert, 22 N. D. 290, 133 N. W. 1035 (1911); Hodson v. Picker, 159 Misc.
356, 287 N. Y. Supp. 642 (1936) ; 3 VERNIER, A ERICAx FAmILY LAWS (1st ed.
1935) 110 names 17 states where it is now a reciprocal duty.
7 See note 4, supra.
8 Lebanon v. Griffin, 45 N. H. 558 (1864) ; Mott v. Mott, 49 N. J. Eq. 192,
22 Atl. 997 (1891).
9 Borum v. Bell, 132 Ala. 85, 31 So. 454 (1901) ; Worth v. Daniel, 1 Ga.
App. 15, 57 S. E. 898 (1907) ; Falls v. Jones, 107 Mo. App. 357, 81 S. W. 455
(1904) ; It re Shelby's Estate, 18 Misc. 719, 49 N. Y. Supp. 964 (1896) ; In re
Delaney's Estate, 27 Misc. 398, 58 N. Y. Supp. 924 (1899).
10 Kempson v. Goss, 69 Ark. 451, 64 S. W. 224 (1901) ; Freto v. Brown, 4
Mass. 675 (1808) ; Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 6 Mass. 272 (1810) ; Worcester
v. Marchant, 14 Pick. 510 (Mass. 1833); Livingstone v. Hammond, 162 Mass.
375, 38 N. E. 968 (1894) ; In re Besondy, 32 Minn. 385 (1884) ; Popejoy v.
Hydraulic Press Brick Co., 193 Mo. App. 612, 186 S. W. 1133 (1916); Gay
v. Ballou, 4 Wend. 403 (N. Y. 1828); Williams v. Hutchinson, 3 N. Y. 312
(1850); Tubb v. Harrison, 4 T. R. 118, 100 Eng. Rep. 967 (K. B. 1790); 2
KENT'S Comm. *193.
31 Albing v. Ward, 137 Mich. 352, 100 N. W. 609 (1904) ; In re Thorne
Estate, 155 N. Y. 140, 49 N. E. 661 (1897) ; In re Huych, 49 Misc. 391, 99 N. Y.
Supp. 502 (1906).
12 Brush v. Blanchard, 18 Il. 47 (1856) ; McMahill v. McMahill, 113 Ill.
461 (1885); Davis v. Gallagher, 37 App. Div. 626, 55 N. Y. Supp. 1060 (4th
Dept. 1899).
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for which he could demand repayment.13 But the step-child was not
altogether forsaken at common law. Equity came to his aid and
imposed a liability wherever possible and held responsible any person
assuming locus parentis even without an express adoption.14  This
assumption must have been in terms of clear liability to impose a duty
where none existed. In keeping with the common law doctrine of no
liability for step-children, it is easily understood that the step-child
could not be bound legally or morally to support his step-parent. 15
Closely aligned with the problem, at comfnon law, of liability for
support of step-children, was the equally difficult situation created by
the necessity to provide for illegitimate children. It is true that in
this case there was a clear duty upon the mother to support the child, 16
but no corresponding obligation was to be found in the father. The
common law absolutely refused to recognize an illegitimate child as
imposing any legal obligation upon the father: 17 the child was nulius
fillius. Still there existed a moral obligation which could not be
denied. This moral obligation was enforced in many ways. The
putative father became liable for any express promises to pay for sup-
port and maintenance of his illegitimate child, and he became bound on
an implied contract to pay therefor where he adopted the child as his
own.
18
Despite the strictness of common law to insist upon a legal obli-
gation to extend liability to any party, there did exist an obligation of
support by parents for their children. This obligation was widely
13 Gerber v. Bauerline, 17 Ore. 115 (1888) ("A stepfather could qualify as
a guardian for the child but did not assume liability and was not in locus
parentis") ; In re Ackerman, 116 N. Y. 654, 22 N. E. 552 (1889) (the grand-
father contracted for recompense for support of child and the contract was
valid as he was not in locus parentis).
14 Murdock v. Murdock, 7 Cal. 511 (1857); Williams v. Hutchinson, 3
Comst. 312 (N. Y. 1850) ; Sharp v. Cropey, 11 Barb. 224 (N. Y. 1851) ; Lantz
v. Frey, 14 Pa. 201 (1850) ; Cooper v. Martin, 4 East 76, 102 Eng. Rep. 759(1803). If stepfather adopts his wife's children, he becomes liable, In re Harris,
16 Ariz. 1, 140 Pac. 825 (1914); Grossman v. Lauber, 29 Ind. 618 (1868);
Murray v. Redell, 21 Hun 409 (N. Y. 1880); Zurt v. Fuchs, 60 Hun 582, 14
N. Y. Supp. 806 (1891) ; Monk v. Hurlburt, 151 Wis. 41, 138 N. W. 59 (1912).15 Bell v. Rice, 50 Neb. 547, 70 N. W. 25 (1897).
16 People v. Green, 19 Cal. 109, 124 Pac. 871 (1912) ; Wright v. Wright,
2 Mass. 109 (1806); Commonwealth v. Callaghan, 223 Mass. 150, 111 N. E.
773 (1916); People v. Landt, 2 Johns. 375 (N. Y. 1807) ; Carpenter v. Whit-
man, 15 Johns. 208 (N. Y. 1818); People ex rel. Estoff v. Chamberlain, 106
N. Y. Supp. 149 (1907) (duty fixed by statute).
17 Simmons v. Bull, 121 Ala. 501 (1852); Glidden v. Nelson, 15 Ill. App.
297 (1884); Moncrief v. Ely, 19 Wend. 405 (N. Y. 1838); Todd v. Weber,
95 N. Y. 181 (1884) ; Bissill v. Myton, 160 App. Div. 268, 145 N. Y. Supp. 591(1st Dept. 1914) ; People ex rel. Lawton v. Snell, 216 N. Y. 527, 111 N. E. 50(1916); Grillo v. Sherman-Statler Co., 195 App. Div. 362, 186 N. Y. Supp.
810 (3d Dept. 1921), af'd, 231 N. Y. 621, 132 N. E. 913 (1921); 1 BL. Co MM.
*459.
18 The moral obligation was recognized and often enforced, Moncrief v.
Ely, 19 Wend. 405 (N. Y. 1838); Birdsall v. Edgerton, 25 Wend. 619 (N. Y.
1843); Todd v. Weber, 95 N. Y. 181 (1884); Sanders v. Sanders, 167 N. C.
319, 83 S. E. 490 (1914) ; State v. Rucher, 86 S. C. 66, 68 S. E. 133 (1910).
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recognized and enforced.10 There can be no refutation of the exis-
tence of a moral obligation, but early decisions conflict as to the
existence of a legal obligation.2 0  However, the weight of authority
holds that it is a legal, as well as a moral, obligation.21 It is logical to
believe the double obligation existed when earliest criminal statutes
imposed a criminal liability upon parents who neglected and abandoned
their children.2 2  Yet, this recognition did not insure parental aid
under all circumstances. The father was primarily liable,23 but only
during minority of the child 24 and then it was the child's responsibility
to make provisions for himself. The marriage of a minor female child
ended the duty of support 2 and did not result in an assumption of
19 People v. Hill, 163 Ill. 186, 191, 46 N. E. 796, 797 (1896) ; Van Valkin-
burgh v. Watson, 13 Johns. 480 (N. Y. 1816) ; People ex rel. Ramm v. Ramm,
197 N. Y. Supp. 234 (1922) ; In re Public Welfare Dept. (Kane v. Nicci), 269
N. Y. 13, 198 N. E. 613 (1935); People ex rel. Deming v. Williams, 161 Misc.
573, 292 N. Y. Supp. 458 (1936) ; Betz v. Horr, 276 N. Y. 83, 11 N. E. (2d)
548 (1937) ; Butler v. Butler, 3 Atk. 58, 26 Eng. Rep. 836 (1743). Father can-
not lose his liability by support of others, Levy v. Levy, 242 App. Div. 773,
274 N. Y. Supp. 340 (2d Dept. 1934). Dire want is not a necessity to force
support, Sanderson v. Sanderson, 149 Misc. 88, 267 N. Y. Supp. 410 (1933).
20 The early English cases which form the basis of the common law of the
United States admitted the moral obligation, but even after fixation of the duty
by statutes, the English courts construed them strictly, holding that a moral
obligation alone was present. In Mortimer v. Wright, 6 M. & W. 482, 488,
151 Eng. Rep. 502, 504 (1840), Parke, B., said: "It is clear principle of law
that a father is not under any legal obligation to pay his son's debts, except
under proceedings by 43 Eliz. C. 2, by which he may, under certain circumstances,
be compelled to support his children according to his ability, but the mere moral
obligation cannot impose any legal liability." Accord: Shelton v. Springett,
11 C. B. 452, 138 Eng. Rep. 549 (1851).
Early American decisions followed closely these rulings and imposed no
legal obligation except under special circumstances or by statute. Raymond v.
Loyl, 10 Barb. 483 (N. Y. 1851); Chilcott v. Trimble, 13 Barb. 502 (N. Y.
1852) ; Freeman v. Robinson, 38 N. J. L. 383 (1876).
21 Studebaker Bros. Mfg. Co. v. De Moss, 62 Ind. App. 635, 647, 113 N. E.
417 (1916) ; Van Valkinburgh v. Watson, 13 Johns. 480 (N. Y. 1816) ; Edwards
v. Davis, 16 Johns. 281, 285 (N. Y. 1819) ; In re Ryder, 11 Paige 185 (N. Y.
1844) ; Crane v. Bandonine, 55 N. Y. 256, 259 (1873) ; Furman v. Van Sise,
56 N. Y. 435, 439 (1874) ; Beardsley v. Hotchkiss, 96 N. Y. 201, 219 (1884);
Manning v. Wells, 8 Misc. 646, 29 N. Y. Supp. 1044 (1894).
22 Rex v. Friend, & wife, 1 Russ. & R. 20, 168 Eng. Rep. 662 (1802);
Regina v. Conde, 10 Cox, C. C. 547 (1867); Gibson v. Commonwealth, 106 Ky.
360, 50 S. W. 532 (1899); CLARK AND MARSHAL, LAW OF CRIMES (2d ed.
1905) 376; TIFFANY, DoMEsTIc RELATIONS (2d ed. 1909) 253.2 3 Leahe v. J. R. King Dry Goods Co., 5 Ga. App. 102, 62 S. E. 729
(1908) ; People v. Reubens, 92 N. Y. Supp. 121 (1904) ; In re Lyon's Estate,
137 N. Y. Supp. 171 (1912); Wignall v. Wignall, 163 Misc. 910, 298 N. Y.
Supp. 251 (1937). Duty imposed by statute, State v. Beslin, 19 Idaho 185,
112 Pac. 1053 (1911).24 Voras v. Rosenberry, 85 Ill. App. 623 (1899); Haynes v. Waggoner,
25 Ind. 174 (1865) ; Studebaker Bros. Mfg. Co. v. De Moss, 62 Ind. App. 635,
113 N. E. 417 (1916); Skidmore v. Skidmore, 160 App. Div. 594, 145 N. Y.
Supp. 939 (2d Dept. 1914) ; In re Willis Estate, 94 Misc. 29, 158 N. Y. Supp.
985 (1916), aff'd, 175 App. Div. 933, 161 N. Y. Supp. 1150 (1st Dept. 1916);
2 KENT'S ComM. *193.
25 Perkins v. Westcoat, 3 Colo. App. 338, 33 Pac. 139 (1893).
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liability by the parent for the son-in-law. A separation between hus-
band and wife did not end the duty to provide necessities for either
wife or children, 20 but where the wife left without good cause and took
the children or kept unlawful custody over them, that was sufficient to
end liability of the husband for the children.2 7  When the infant left
the home with the consent of his parents, they did not lose their lia-
bility.28 But where the infant voluntarily abandoned the home, he
could not bind his parents even for necessities.29  A divorce did not
end the father's liability for support,3 0 but where the decree gave cus-
tody to the mother she had the primary obligation, and the divorced
husband was only responsible in event of her inability. 31 Naturally,
death ended the father's primary duty, but the widow was held respon-
sible to support the minor children.3 2 In certain cases, the infant
children had an independent source of support, but this did not relieve
the parents of their obligation, and only in cases of absolute necessity
was an infant forced to resort to his own estate to furnish the means
for his own support.3 3 Yet, where the infant did have an independent
source of income, the mother was relieved of her duty when it evolved
upon her.34
26 Maxwell v. Boyd, 123 Mo. App. 334, 100 S. W. 540 (1907); Town of
Rumney v. Keyes, 7 N. H. 571 (1835) ; Kimball v. Keyes, 11 Wend. 32 (N. Y.
1833) ; Greenhut v. Rosenstein, 7 Daly 164 (N. Y. 1877).27 Baldwin v. Foster, 138 Mass. 449 (1885) ; City of N. Y. v. Itzkowitz,
200 App. Div. 839, 191 N. Y. Supp. 919 (2d Dept. 1921). Contra: People v.
Reubens, 92 N. Y. Supp. 121 (1904) ; Jones v. Jones, 161 Misc. 660, 292 N. Y.
Supp. 221 (1937).
28 McMillen v. Lee, 78 Ill. 443 (1875) ; De Wane v. Hansow, 56 Ill. App.
575 (1894); Gay v. Ballou, 4 Wend. 403 (N. Y. 1828).
29 Raymond v. Loyl, 10 Barb. 483 (N. Y. 1851).
30 Hall v. Hall, 141 Ga. 361, 80 S. E. 992 (1914) ; Conn v. Conn, 57 Ind.
323 (1877); Bennett v. Robinson, 180 Mo. App. 56, 165 S. W. 856 (1914);
Thomas v. Thomas, 41 Wis. 229 (1876); Stockwell v. Stockwell, 87 Vt. 424,
89 Atl. 478 (1914). Contra: Bondis v. Bondis, 40 Okla. 164, 136 Pac. 1089
(1913).
31 Finch v. Finch, 22 Conn. 411 (1853) ; Ellis v. Hewitt, 15 Ga. App. 693,
84 S. E. 185 (1915); Brow v. Brightman, 136 Mass. 187 (1883); Burritt v.
Burritt, 29 Barb. 124 (N. Y. 1859); Exchange Bank & Trust Co. v. Finley,
73 S. C. 423, 53 S. E. 649 (1906).
32 Inhabitants of Dedham v. Inhabitants of Natick, 16 Mass. 140 (1819);
Mo. Pacific Ry. v. Palmer 55 Neb. 559, 76 N. W. 169 (1898) ; Gray v. Durland,
50 Barb. 100 (N. Y. 1867); Furman v. Van Sise, 56 N. Y. 435 (1874); Welch
v. Welch, 200 N. Y. Supp. 652 (1923). Contra: Whipple v. Dow, 2 Mass. 415
(1807) ; 2 KENT'S Comm. *191.
33 The father's primary duty exceeds the child's ability to support himself,
In re Harris' Estate, 16 Ariz. 1, 140 Pac. 825 (1914) ; Rowe v. Raper, 23 Ind.
App. 27, 54 N. E. 770 (1899); In re Wilber's Estate, 27 Misc. 53, 57 N. Y.
Supp. 942 (1899) ; In re Davis' Estate, 98 App. Div. 546, 90 N. Y. Supp. 244(4th Dept. 1904), aff'd, 184 N. Y. 299, 77 N. E. 259 (1904); In re Cohen's
Estate, 153 Misc. 757, 276 N. Y. Supp. 59 (1934). But where father's means
are insufficient, the child must support and educate himself from his own estate,
Fuller v. Fuller, 23 Fla. 236, 2 So. 426 (1887); Beardsley v. Hotchkiss, 96
N. Y. 201, 220 (1884).




However much recognition was given at common law to the*
parental obligation of support, no corresponding liability can be shown
to rest upon the grandparents in the event the parents failed in 'their
duty.35 Even less liability could be imputed to grandparents for
illegitimate children.36 The common law seemed jealous to bestow
its protection freely, and liability arose only when a parent's or step-
parent's acts could be strictly construed as intending to impose an
obligation for support.
It was only in the relationship of husband and wife that the com-
mon law unhesitantly placed a liability for support.37 Even here the
wife's actions determined the extent of this liability. Where her
actions were such as to imply or express a refusal of support, then the
common law courts would not act to enforce the obligation that
existed.38 The degree of support rested within the control of the
husband. He was liable only for necessities which in turn were deter-
mined by his station in life.3 9
III.
Considering the strictness of the common law, it is only natural
that the changing conception of a social and moral obligation of sup-
port be reflected in the modem statutory rules. Human necessity, as
always, was the determiner of the new policy for support of depen-
dents. The common law could not furnish adequate relief for the
suffering created by the strictness of its application. Equity could
not fill in the gaps with relief based only on a moral obligation. Early
English legislators sought to fix a legal obligation.4 ° These laws have
since been re-enacted into our present system of law and are given
broad interpretation. But no longer do the courts base their decisions
only upon a pure legal obligation. The opinions are now determined
35 People ex rel. Ramm v. Ramm, 197 N. Y. Supp. 234 (1922) ; Kiser v.
Overseers of Frankfort, 3 N. J. L. 410 (1808) ; Sharum v. Sharum, 101 Okla.
273, 275, 225 Pac. 682 (1924) ; In re Whiting, 3 Pittsb. (Pa.) 129 (1869) ; In re
Lafferty's Estate, 147 Pa. 283, 23 At. 445 (1892) ; In re Wall's Estate, 13 Pa.
C. C. 413 (1893).
36 Inhabitants of Hiram v. Pierce, 45 Me. 367 (1858) ; Director of Poor v.
Hichman, 4 Pa. Dist. 494 (1895); 2 KENT'S Comm. *96, 212.
, See note 5, mtpra.
38 Thus adultery and abandonment were sufficient to relieve husband of his
liability, Reardon v. Reardon, 210 Ala. 129, 97 So. 138 (1923); Pearson v.
Pearson, 230 N. Y. 141, 129 N. -E. 349 (1921) ; Wirth v. Wirth, 184 App. Div.
643, 172 N. Y. Supp. 309 (1st Dept. 1918); City of N. Y. v. Itzkowitz, 200
App. Div. 839, 191 N. Y. Supp. 919 (2d Dept. 1921); Note (1938) 13 ST.
JOHN'S L. Rav. 106.
31 Pattberg v. Pattberg, 94 N. J. Eq. 715, 120 Atl. 790 (1923) ; Note (1938)
13 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 106.
40 The earliest English laws imposing any liability on relatives are found
in 18 ELIZ. c. 3 (1570) and 43 ELIZ. c. 2, § 7 (1601), which form the basis of
the N. Y. Dom. REL. COURT AcT § 101. Former N. Y. CODE OF CRIM. PROC.
§ 839 enforced the criminal liability and is now covered by § 914. The early
English laws were followed by other laws which, in turn, were adopted by the
colonial legislatures and became part of the state law in the United States.
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by public policy.41 The statutes are all-embracing and insure liability
where the common law hesitated or refused. With public policy act-
ing as the determiner in enforcing the obligation, it is natural to see a
much broader view taken by the courts. The father has still the
primary obligation, and his wife may sue him to enforce it,42 but where
he fails, the duty continues on to the mother and then to the grand-
parents.43 But, to bind the mother or grandparents it is necessary to
show absolutely the father's inability to provide adequately. 44  Upon
the father's death, the duty of support follows the same order. The
obligations created by statute between parent and child, grandparent
and grandchild, or step-parent and step-child are determined by pub-
lic policy and cannot be waived or contracted away. 45 Any agreement
entered into concerning the support of children must be approved by
the proper court or public welfare authorities in order to be binding.46
Nor may the father try to escape liability by such abuse of the children
that he is relieved of custody and control of them.47  The legal obliga-
tions now created are not limited to the infant children, but where an
adult- child is helpless or there is danger of his becoming a public
charge then liability arises. 48 Certain defenses, available at common
'law, as waiver of the obligation by contract or voluntary emancipation
41 N. Y. Dom. REL. COURT AcT § 92 (4) makes all orders of support run
until 17 years unless child will later become public charge. City of New York
v. Cohen, 143 Misc. 27, 256 N. Y. Supp. 155, aff'd, 259 N. Y. 645, 182 N. E. 217
(1932); Winter v. Winter, 246 App. Div. 232, 285 N. Y. Supp. 260 (lst Dept.
1936); Germer v. Germer, 167 Misc. 882, 4 N. Y. S. (2d) 747 (1938) ; In re
Ford, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 932 (1939).
42 Leibold v. Leibold, 158 Ind. 60, 62 N. E. 627 (1902) ; Alvey v. Hartwig,
106 Md. 254, 67 Atl. 132 (1907).
43 N. Y. Dom. REL. COURT AcT § 101. The statute thus determines the
order of liability. N. Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 132 provides for liability of mother
if possessed of sufficient property.
44 People ex rel. Ramm v. Ramm, 197 N. Y. Supp. 234 (1922); Szilagyi v.
Szilagyi, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 440 (1939).
45 Perkins v. Westcoat, 3 Colo. App. 338, 33 Pac. 139 (1893); Wright v.
Teupp, 70 N. J. Eq. 130, 62 Atl. 464 (1905) ; Von Roeder v. Miller, 117 Misc.
106, 190 N. Y. Supp. 787 (1921) ; Kriss v. Kriss, 246 App. Div. 847, 285 N. Y.
Supp. 58 (2d Dept. 1936).
46 N. Y. Dom. R L. LAw § 121 makes an agreement by mother or child or
their agent, concerning support binding only if approved by a judge, except
where entered into by a public official with such authority.
Ippolito v. Terragni, 140 Misc. 606, 251 N. Y. Supp. 376 (1931) holds act
not retroactive as to agreements prior to its enactment.
47 Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 124 Cal. 677, 57 Pac. 674 (1899) ; Leibold v.
Leibold, 158 Ind. 60, 62 N. E. 627 (1902) ; Rankin v. Rankin, 83 Mo. App. 335
(1900).
48 Drain v. Malone, 130 Ky. 125, 113 S. W. 67 (1908) ; Cromwell v. Ben-
jamin, 41 Barb. 558 (N. Y. 1863) ; In re Van Denburgh, 178 App. Div. 237,
164 N. Y. Supp. 966 (3d Dept. 1917); In re Willis' Estate, 94 Misc. 29, 158
N. Y. Supp. 985 (1916), aff'd, 175 App. Div. 933, 161 N. Y. Supp. 1150 (lst
Dept. 1916); Winter v. Winter, 246 App. Div. 232, 285 N. Y. Supp. 260 (1st
Dept. 1936); Fagal v. Riger, 247 App. Div. 853, 286 N. Y. Supp. 484 (3d
Dept. 1936) ; Frankel v. Goldstein, 155 Misc. 531, 280 N. Y. Supp. 191 (1935).
Where the adult child stays home, common law liability exists, Brown v. Ram-
say, 29 N. J. L. 117, 120 (1860).
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by the child, are now swept aside where it is evident that the child will
become a public charge. 49  The courts seek to place liability on the
parents wherever possible rather than let the public bear the burden.
Always, where there is imminent danger that one of the parties in the
action will become a public charge, the courts impose the liability of
support on the proper person.50
In common with the extension of liability for support of children,
the law took recognition of the illegitimate child and fastened a duty
of support upon the putative father.51 The law now permits the
mother to establish the paternity 52 of the infant and the court will
force the father to bear all necessary expenses 53 of the mother and the
child. As there was no duty at common law, the courts are still reluc-
tant to impose liability where no order of filiation has been entered.54
Bfit even if such order has been entered, the liability only extends to
sixteen years of age. Once the order of filiation has been entered, the
subsequent marriage of the mother to another cannot relieve the puta-
tive father of his obligations 55 unless the husband expressly adopts the
child. Similarly has adoption, purely statutory, become recognized
as creating a liability upon the foster parents, who assume under the
statute all the duties of the natural parents, and relieve the natural
parents of all obligations.56 No decisions have as yet construed the
4 9 Winter v. Winter, 246 App. Div. 232, 285 N. Y. Supp. 260 (1st Dept.
1936); Fagal v. Riger, 247 App. Div. 853, 286 N. Y. Supp. 484 (3d Dept.
1936) ; In re Goyette's Estate, 141 Misc. 80, 252 N. Y. Supp. 566 (1931).50 See note 42, supra.
52 18 ELIZ. c. 3 (1570) ; 4 & 5 Win. IV, c. 76, § 72 (1834) ; 7 & 8 Vict. c.
101 (1844); N. Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 120; 4 VERNIER, AmERIcAN FAMILY
LAWS (1936) 91, n.19: "* * * 13 jurisdictions provide for express support of
illegitimate children apart from poor laws and bastardy proceedings (Iowa,
Nev., N. M., N. Y., N. D., S. D., Wyo., Minn., Ariz., Cal., Ga., N. J.,
La.)." State ex rel. MacArthur v. Evans, 19 Ind. 92 (1862) ; Mann v. People,
35 Ill. 467 (1864); Bailey . Chesley, 64 Mass. 284 (1852); People ex rel.
Lawton v. Snell, 216 N. Y. 527, 111 N. E. 50 (1916).
52 N. Y. Dom. REz. LAW § 122(2) : "Proceedings to establish the paternity
of the child may be instituted during the pregnancy of the mother or after the
birth of the child, but shall not be brought after the lapse of more than two
years from the birth of the child, unless paternity has been acknowledged by the
father in writing or by the furnishing of support * * *."
N. Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 126a: "Blood grouping tests. The court, on motion
of the defendant, shall order the mother, her child and the defendant to submit
to one or more blood grouping tests by a duly qualified physician to determine
whether or not the defendant can be excluded as being the father of the child,
and the results of such tests may be received in evidence but only in cases where
definite exclusion is established."
N. Y. Dom. RFt. LAW § 127 provides for an order of filiation, stating the
paternity and provides for support. Liability continues up to 16 years of age.
63 N. Y. Dom. Rz'. LAw § 120; Jones v. Jones, 161 Misc. 660, 292 N. Y.
Supp. 221 (1937); Hacher v. Anonymous, 163 Misc. 832, 299 N. Y. Supp. 460(1937).
34 People v. Polep, 233 App. Div. 450, 253 N. Y. Supp. 253 (3d Dept. 1931).
55 People v. Fermoile, 236 App. Div. 388, 259 N. Y. Supp. 564 (4th Dept.
1932).
56 Adoption was unknown at common law and arises only by statute which
relieves natural parent of liability and places it all on foster parents, In re Heye,
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liability of the parents of the foster parents for the adopted child.
However, it would seem logical, after viewing the contractual obliga-
tion of adoption, that there can be no liability upon the parents of the
foster parents as they were not parties to the adoption agreement and
cannot interfere in the proceedings. It must be remembered that
adoption was unknown at common law and grandparents did not have
liability for grandchildren. Therefore, despite a tendency to place a
liberal interpretation on support legislation, any statute changing these
rules must be strictly construed. 57 Also, it seems apparent that nat-
ural grandparents do not lose their liability even though there has been
an adoption. In view of the express duty imposed by statute, the
grandparents still continue liable as they were not parties to the adop-
tion agreements. 58  In the case of a step-father, who had no liability
at common law, he now has a statutory duty where he has knowledge
of the existence of the child prior to his marriage whether the child is
legitimate or not.59 This liability is co-existent with that of the
father.60 But such liability is at all times strictly construed and does
not extend to adult step-children. 61
The common law obligation between the husband and wife has
been strengthened and broadened in many ways. Many of the former
defenses by the husband, such as a separation agreement, misconduct
or desertion, are now ignored when it appears that the wife will
become a public charge. 62 It is now a recognized duty between spouses
to maintain each other where one lacks the proper means.63 The
degree and the amount of support that is required is still determined
by the spouse's income and station in life.
An entirely new field for the courts was in enforcing a liability
upon children, both infant and adult, to support their indigent parents.
This is purely statutory. 64  But since it is based on public policy it
241 App. Div. 907 (4th Dept. 1934) ; Gross v. Gross, 110 Misc. 278, 179 N. Y.
Supp. 900 (1920); Betz v. Horr, 276 N. Y. 83, 11 N. E. (2d) 548 (1937);
Op. Atty. Gen. 482 (1933).
57 In re Bainber, 147 Misc. 712, 265 N. Y. Supp. 798 (1933) ; In re Mark's
Adoption, 159 Misc. 348, 287 N. Y. Supp. 800 (1936).
58 N. Y. Dom. REL. COURT AcT § 101 places an express liability that cannot
be contracted away.
59 N. Y. Dom. REL. COURT AcT § 101(5) ; N. Y. PUBLIC WEL. LAW § 125;
Jones v. Jones, 161 Misc. 660, 292 N. Y. Supp. 221 (1937).
60 Jones v. Jones, 161 Misc. 660, 292 N. Y. Supp. 221 (1937).
61 Op. Atty. Gen., 51 St. Dept. 284 (1934); -People ex rel. Deming v. Wil-
liams, 161 Misc. 573, 292 N. Y. Supp. 458 (1936).6 2 People v. Pollack, 198 N. Y. Supp. 569 (1923) ; City of New York v.
Cohen, 143 Misc. 27, 256 N. Y. Supp. 155, aff'd, 259 N. Y. 645, 182 N. E. 217(1932); City of New York v. Jansen, 150 Misc. 268, 268 N. Y. Supp. 542
(1934). But if paramour of wife gives sufficient support, the husband is not
liable, Germer v. Germer, 167 Misc. 882, 4 N. Y. S. (2d) 747 (1938). Mis-
conduct by wife and facts showing her independent income relieves husband of
support, Lifshitz v. Lifshitz, 249 App. Div. 859, 292 N. Y. Supp. 717 (2d Dept.
1937).
63 See note 6, supra.
64 Stone v. Stone, 32 Conn. 142 (1864) ; Lebanon v. Griffin, 45 N. H. 558
(1864); Edwards v. Davis, 16 Johns. 281 (N. Y. 1819); Rex v. Munden, 1
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has been construed liberally. It extends to grandchildren in enforcing
support to grandparents. 65  This statutory liability cannot be waived
or contracted away as such agreements are void as against public
policy.66 The statutes are merely giving recognition to a moral obli-
gation that always existed but could never be enforced. Despite the
moral obligation, no liability can be imposed upon the children to
support their natural parents after they have been adopted by foster
parents,67 but, naturally, they must support the foster parents. Infant
children can be forced to contribute to the support of their parents
only if they have sufficient means.68
In keeping with the broad rights and duties created by the stat-
utes for relief of dependents, the power of enforcement is threefold in
nature, arising in the courts,6 9 the public authorities, 70 or the indigent
persons. Both a civil and criminal liability is created where there is a
failure to act. Abandonment by a person who has the burden of
support is a misdemeanor,71 and it is not changed by collateral statutes
Strange 190, 93 Eng. Rep. 465 (K. B. 1780) ; SCHOULER, DOMESTIC RELATIONS(6th ed. 1921) 787 (stating that there was no common law liability by adult
child to support parent). But statutes originating in England (43 ELIZ. c. 2[1601]) and adopted in the United States have fixed a legal liability, 2 KENT'S
Comt. *208. The Athenians compelled children to provide for their father if
he was destitute, 2 POTTER'S ANTiQ. 347, 351. Formerly, where children failed
to support their parents, the latter could disinherit them. Ex parte Hunt, 5
Cow. 284 (N. Y. 1826); Stone v. Burgers, 47 N. Y. 521 (1872); 2 KENT'S
Comm. *208. At present the statutory liability exists in all but 11 states in the
United States, Bradley v. Finn, 103 Conn. 1, 3, 130 Atl. 126, 127 (1925).
Destitution is the basis of support by children, Beutel v. State, 36 Ohio App.
73, 172 N. E. 838 (1930) ; Note (1931) 16 ST. Louis L. REv. 334-335.65 N. Y. Dom. REL. COURT ACT § 101; 4 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAmILY LAWS
(1936) 92 (stating there are 21 jurisdictions which make grandchildren liable
for support of relatives).
66 Kriss v. Kriss, 246 App. Div. 847, 285 N. Y. Supp. 58 (2d Dept. 1936);
N. Y. PUBLIC WEL. LAw § 125; N. Y. CoDE OF CRIM. PROC. § 914.
67 Op. Atty. Gen. 482 (1933).
68 N. Y. PUBLIC WEL. LAW § 125: "No liability for support shall be imposed
upon a minor child or a grandchild * * * unless the Court * * * shall expressly
find the money and property * * * are in excess of the reasonable requirements
of such infant."
69 By statute the Domestic Relations Court, consisting of the Children's
Court and the Family Court, was created to treat with the special problems that
arise in the family, which includes the duty of support.
70 The public welfare authorities have been given wide authority to cope
with the problem of support. They are supported by statutes which give effect
to their work: N. Y. PUBLIC WEL. LAW § 126 empowers the public welfare
official to sue to compel support; N. Y. Dom. REL_ LAW § 122 provides the
superintendent with an action for support by the mother. The municipality may
sue to recover expenses incurred in supporting a person when there is a person
liable or capable of supporting said person, People ex rel. Kilpatrick v. Crow-
ley, 20 Misc. 160, 45 N. Y. Supp. 824, aff'd, 25 App. Div. 175, 49 N. Y. Supp.
214 (2d Dept. 1898) ; Hodson v. Grumlich, 156 Misc. 199, 280 N. Y. Supp. 249(1935) ; Tolley v. Maliswaski, 159 Misc. 89, 287 N. Y. Supp. 245 (1936) ; N. Y.
PUBLIC WEL. LAW § 126; N. Y. CODE OF CRar. PRoc. §§ 914, 915.
73 N. Y. PENAL LAW §§ 482, 840: "A person who wilfully omits * ** to
perform a duty by law imposed upon him to furnish food, clothing, shelter * * *
to a minor as may be required by order of the court is guilty of a misdemeanor."
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fixing civil liability.72 Under the present Domestic Relations Court
Act,73 the order of civil liability is shown. This liability is enforced
by sequestration of property, furnishing of security, jail sentence, or
probation.7 4 All these remedies must be guided by law of the domicile
of the father,75 as the father and husband still maintains the right to
create the domicile of the family.
IV.
Conclusion.
A review of the decisions of the courts in the light of statutory
regulation shows only one result. The duty of support is now placed
upon relatives and not upon the public. The common law obligation
was based mainly on a legal duty which at times was difficult to find.
Its strictness inevitably had to be changed to fit into more modern
concepts of social obligations. Public policy now determines the deci-
sions of the courts in fixing liability for support of dependent relatives.
All support legislation is representative of the present tendency to
relieve the public of any obligation. The statutory regulations fixing
the liability for the recipient of public relief are to protect the public
from loss due to neglect of a moral or natural duty imposed, and does
so by transforming that duty into a statutory and legal liability. The
statutes providing for adoption,76 for legitimatization of children with
the resulting duty of support,77 and the enforcement of a duty upon
children to support less fortunate relatives 78 all result from a recogni-
tion of the social problem that existed under the common law. But
the legislation does not cover completely all existing problems. Where
the laws set aside the rule at common law, the courts, despite their
liberal tendencies, still construe the new obligations strictly. The
legislatures have sought to place liability in all possible situations that
might arise, but where the statute does not apply, the common law is
binding. The laws among the various states in the United States are
not uniform, and this hampers freedom in enforcement. Each state is
People v. Joyce, 112 App. Div. 717, 98 N. Y. Supp. 863 (4th Dept. 1906), aff'd,
189 N. Y. 518, 81 N. E. 1171 (1906); People v. Lewis, 132 App. Div. 256,
116 N. Y. Supp. 893 (1st Dept. 1909).
72 People v. Rogers, 248 App. Div. 141, 288 N. Y. Supp. 900 (1st Dept.
1936) ; N. Y. PENAL LAW § 2500.
7 See note 44, supra.
74 N. Y. PuBLIc WEL. LAW § 127 allows for seizure of property or person
liable for support. N. Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 129 provides that security may be
required, or person liable for support may be put in jail or on probation.
,5 The domicile must be bona fide, Coldingham Parish Council v. Smith(1918), 2 K. B. 90. Husband's residence is domicile of the family, State v.
Beslin, 19 Idaho 185, 112 Pac. 1053 (1911) ; Harris v. Harris, 83 App. Div. 123,
82 N. Y. Supp. 568 (2d Dept. 1903); Mallina v. Mallina, 167 Misc. 343, 4 N. Y.
S. (2d) 27 (1938).
76 N. Y. Dom. REL. LAW §§ 110 to 118.
77 N. Y. Dom. REL. LAW §§ 119 to 139.
78 N. Y. Dom. RFL. CoURT Act §§ 101 to 103.
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limited to its own jurisdiction. As the domicile of the father deter-
mines the law that controls, it is easy to see how inconsistencies in the
law between the states work a hardship and prevent adequate enforce-
ment and relief. With the liberalization of divorce laws, a problem of
care of unwanted children arises which is not met completely. Nor
has liability as yet been determined between brother and sister for
support.79 In commercial fields uniform law has met with evident
success, and a uniform system of family laws should be advocated.80
The tremendous advance in the recognition of the moral obligation for
support of dependent relatives, and its present enforcement by the
courts is an indication that the public will continue, wherever possible,
to remedy the weaknesses that still exist.
ROBERT M. POST.
THE BASIS OF RECOVERY FOR Loss OF CONSORTIUM.
The family ways of English speaking peoples have changed
greatly since the day when a wife was regarded as nothing more than
the chattel of her husband.1 The law had always recognized a right
in the man to the exclusive possession of his wife, and any interference
with his right of property in her would enable him to sue out a writ
of trespass. The wife, on the other hand, was not recognized as a
legal entity for either of two reasons: (1) she had vested rights but
could not enforce them because of the disabilities of coverture,2 or
(2) she had no rights at all because of her inferior position in the
marriage relationship.3 Such procedural fiction served the courts
until the passage of the Enabling Acts.4 Then the problems arose as
79 Lee v. Smith, 161 Misc. 43, 291 N. Y. Supp. 47 (1936).
so Note (1908) 21 HARV. L. REv. 416, 510, 519, 583; Note (1911) 5 ILL. L.
REv. 521-544.
1 "The law of England and the United States on this topic (law of husband
and wife), has undergone a remarkable change. * * * The old common law
theory of marriage, that of unity of person and property in the husband, is so
repugnant to modern ideas that it has been almost entirely swept away. * * *"
1 SCHOULER, MARRIAGE, DIvoRcE, SEPARATION AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS (6th
ed. 1921) 5.
"Perhaps the characteristic of the twentieth century family that most
sharply challenges the attention of the student of family history is its instability.
It is a far cry from the closely knit, highly unified family organization of the
ancient Romans or the Middle-Age Teutons to the more loosely organized
household of modern time wherein each member tends to claim independence as
an individual with a personality to be developed and respected." GooDSE., A
HISTORY OF THE FAMILY AS A SOCIAL AND EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION (1930)
456.
2 Bennett v. Bennett, 116 N. Y. 584, 23 N. E. 17 (1889).
3 3 BL Comm. *142, 143.
4 One example of such legislation is that of New York, N. Y. Dom. REL.
LAW §§ 50, 51, 52, 53, 56, 57, 59, 60.
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